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How Much Should a Child Cost? 
A Response to Paul Johnson 
James Burtchaell, C.S.C. 
Father Burtchaell is a member 
of the theology department at 
the University of Notre Dame. 
Paul Johnson begins his inquiry into the ethics of letting defective 
infants die by rejecting the position of Joseph Fletcher that they may 
not, in some instances, be humans at all. In his well-known pieces on 
"indicators of humanhood " Fletcher has offered a checklist of qual-
ities one might require of a being for him /her /it to qualify (and be 
protected) as a human: e.g., neo-cortical function, curiosity , a sense of 
time, self-awareness. Minimal intelligence, for instance, would be 
demanded: "Any individual of the species homo sapiens who falls 
below the I.Q. 40-mark in a standard Stanford-Binet test, amplified if 
you like by other tests, is questionably a person; below the 20-mark, 
not a person. Homo is indeed sapiens, in order to be homo. "1 Johnson 
disagrees. The question, he says, is not whether defective newborns are 
human children; all live progeny of women and men must be human. 
The question is, rather, what their relative value as humans might be. 
I shall be arguing that the position Johnson takes is considerably 
more savage even than the barbarities Fletcher espouses. 
To reckon the value of a given infant's life, Johnson explains , we 
must estimate the quality, realized or potential, that this life possesses. 
A child's value is related to the degree to which he or she can be 
expected to attain those higher fun ctions which are most character-
istic of human personhood and which distinguish humans from lower 
species of animal life. Since the purpose of human life is not merely 
biological existence, not simply to m etabolize, we must calculate it as 
valuable to the extent that it attains higher goods, by being actively 
and fruitfully inter-personal. Relying on Richard McCormick, the dis-
tinguished Jesuit moralist, Johnson argues that it is an ability to relate 
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to other humans which is the essential and validating activity for 
human persons. "McCormick places special emphasis on relational 
potential. Life is a good insofar as it affords access to higher goods, in 
particular to the goods of social relatedness and relationship to the 
transcendent through relationship to neighbor. Thus, this relational 
potential would be the touchstone of quality of life jUdgments. 
McCormick argues, 'It is neither inhuman nor unchristian to say that 
there comes a point where an individual's condition itself represents 
the negation of any truly human -i.e., relational-potential . . .. When 
in human judgment this potential is totally absent or would be, because 
of the condition of the individual, totally subordinated to the mere 
effort for survival, that life can be said to have achieved its potential.' " 
The problem faced by parents, physicians, public servants and the 
ethicists who advise them is that the resources and attention needed 
for the survival of infants can vary greatly. Some seriously defective or 
damaged or diseased children need therapeutic care well beyond the 
means of most families, thus bringing a private need into the jurisdic-
tion of public policy. Are we ethically obliged to nurture every infant, 
whatever the cost, whatever the benefit? Fletcher would relieve us of 
some burden by declaring some of the most crippled infants to be 
non-humans. Johnson is anxious to find some way , while insisting that 
all newborn children are humans, to assess their claims on our care 
according to some reasonable scale. 
He begins by stipulating that all humans have value, and follows this 
with assurances that we should treat an infant with a "preference for 
its protection," and that this "bias toward life" should give a newborn 
the benefit of the doubt when we are deliberating whether he or she 
should live or be let die. What this seems to mean is that the burden of 
proof lies, not with the child struggling to live, but with anyone dis-
posed to decide it should die. While this "bias toward life" is perhaps 
not so ardent that any of us would confidently entrust our own life or 
health to a medical staff so mildly motivated , it is difficult to quarrel 
with those who assert at the outset that all human life has value. Yet 
that is exactly where one needs to take issue, for there is a lethal error 
at the very threshold of this argument. 
So many things can be valuable to us: a week's holiday from work, 
a loving parent, a collection of books, a garden with lawn and flowers, 
strong athletic dexterity, a fine education, a full head of hair, a true 
friend, shoes that do not leak, a symphony concert, an air conditioner. 
Even social institutions like the state deal in many varied valuables: a 
' park system, peace between nations, secure retirement benefits, pre-
natal care, stable banking, clean waterways, reliable pharmaceuticals. 
The thing about valuable things is that they have such different values. 
No;t only are they unequal; they are sometimes incommensurable. 
Ho'w compare the value of a faithful , loving husband to that of a legal 
career . .. or of a second car in the garage? How assess the relative 
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values of full employment and of better railway roadbeds? Or the 
relative disvalues of juvenile, drug-related crime and a soybean crop 
failure? How compare the incomparable? Yet we do this all the time, 
as anyone knows who has deliberated whether to move the family in 
order to secure a professional promotion, or has sat long on a budget 
committee. 
Dealing with Values 
When we deal in values we are treating of "lesser" and "greater" 
and "different." And yet we can choose among them. It is said that 
every thing has its price, and that every person can be bought. But the 
fundamental measure of value is neither money, nor the work that 
money represents, nor the portion of our life and time and energy 
given to the work. The basic measure of our value is our own self: how 
much do I value this thing, this opportunity, this person? What other 
valued things am I willing to give for it, for her, for him? The medium 
of barter among valuable things may not always be money, but they 
all can be and are traded off against one another. 
What I mean when I accord you value is that you have a worth for 
me. Other humans are valued insofar as they serve needs or wants. We 
possess a calculus whereby to reckon who is worth what. To the scale 
of other persons' needs I can apply the scale of my own resources, and 
also the scale of how generously I would yield the resources to meet 
others' needs, according to how valuable those persons are to me. 
The Johnson-McCormick argument on selective withholding of 
treatment from defective newborn children appears to pivot around 
what value such treatment might have for the infants themselves. But 
a close examination of this value-theory discloses that the pivotal 
value is not internal to the lives and interests of the infants, but what 
value those children have to others. 
Let me try to illustrate this first by comparisons. A short while ago 
a young orderly in a Swedish home for the elderly was accused of 
killing a dozen or more of the residents by offering them carbonated 
drinks laced with corrosive acid. These old people, he later explained, 
were leading meaningless lives. What did this "meaningless" mean? 
Was the young man stating that, in his judgment, the relational poten-
tial of these old people was now totally used up, or that it had become 
totally subordinated to the mere effort for survival? Or was he saying 
simply that they were now more trouble than they were worth? What-
ever his drift, he was making a life-and-death judgment that appears to 
involve three variables: how much care the old people required; how 
much relational or spiritual activity so much care would make pos-
sible, and how dear these persons were to him. For himself as a staffer, 
or for the Swedish public whose interests he decided to assert, there 
seemed to be no adequately "meaningful" outcome from institutional 
care. The old folks' lives may have had some fundamental value, but 
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now no longer enough value to justify continued care. Now, although 
his statement may appear to have considered the matter from the 
standpoint and interests of the old men and women, the decisive 
variable was related, not to them (how much meaningful outcome), 
but to himself and the public he claimed to represent (how meaningful 
it was having them around to care for). The measure of meaning was 
not the victims, but the one who sent them to their deaths. 
One remembers similar applications of this value-theory. The 
orderly's judgment about "meaningful life" put me in mind of the 
Nazi formula, lebensunwertes Leben (life not worth living), which was 
frequently used when the Third Reich had recourse to judgments of 
relative value on human lives. The Slavs, they decided, were Unter-
menschen, sub-humans fit only for slave labor. Well below them on 
the value scale were Gypsies and, lower still, Jews, the bacilli of 
society. Values at this lowest level were finely calculated. There were 
Jews, and Mischlinge (cross-breeds) first-class, and Mischlinge second-
class. These categories could be subdivided into "productive" and 
"non-productive." Bolshevik commissars in the Soviet army were also 
quite unvaluable, as were other " useless eaters" and "anti-socials": 
mental patients, the enfeebled elderly, unrecoverably wounded sol-
diers, "racially valueless children" and, to come full circle to what we 
are presently considering, defective newborn children (the very first of 
all these categories for whom Hitler approved an extermination order) . 
It cannot be said that the Nazis assigned no value to human life . Their 
programs were grounded precisely on an elaborate scale of values. At 
its base the value system was quite simple. As Hitler once explained to 
a gathering of general officers, he decided upon the "removal of the 
Jews from our nation, not because we would begrudge them their 
existence - we congratulate the rest of the world on their company-
but because the existence of our own nation is a thousand times more 
important to us than that of an alien race." 2 
A few decades earlier, liberal reformers in England had been propos-
ing and legislating social policies that, in their way, were also value-
responsive . "It was, to illustrate, the law of the land that upon certifi-
cation of any two doctors, any person might be incarcerated indef-
initely for feeblemindedness . Charles Wicksteed Armstrong was say-
ing: 'the nation which first begins to breed for efficiency - denying 
the right of the scum to beget millions of their kind ... is the nation 
destined to rule the earth .... To diminish the dangerous fertility of 
the unfit there are three methods : the lethal chamber, segregation and 
sterilization.' The professor of eugenics at London University was pro-
posing that paupers, tramps, and the insane be left to starve; otherwise 
the fertile but unfit would continue to reproduce and prevent England 
from continuing as a world power. A physician with governmental 
authority who was concerned with mental deficiency tested his theory 
that it was due to small skulls by operating on children's heads; a 
February, 1980 57 
fourth of them died. When the National Insurance Act required com-
pulsory contributions from all workers, it provided that workmen 
could be denied unemployment compensation if they had been dis-
charged for misconduct - insolence, for example. Pensions were with-
held from those who had been in prison or had 'persistently failed to 
work.' "3 
Assigning a Variable Value 
When one is prepared to assign a variable value to other human 
beings according as they are expected to rise to a high level of social 
performance, and then to allot to them a corresponding measure of 
life's sustenance, this is no ethical refinement. It is the same old busi-
ness of the runt of the litter getting pushed away from the teat. All 
too often when we apologize that it would be too unkind to make 
some creature face so unsatisfying an existence, what we really mean 
is that we don't want to pay his or her bills. 
By evaluating human beings insofar as they are "relational, " or by 
"what they can come to be," or by their "personal or social conscious-
ness," their "quality of life," their " access to higher goods," their 
potential for attaining a "truly human life," we assign to our fellows a 
value measured by their active participation in our society. The ideally 
valuable, "truly human life" at its best appears to belong to a tax-
paying adult who earns a living. To the extent that one falls short of 
this ideal, by infancy or senility or criminality or retardation or 
infirmity, one slips down the value scale. Behind all this calculation 
lurks a readiness to appraise others according as they are pleasant or 
congenial or contributory towards ourselves, and then to act on this 
appraisal. 
I discern two ethical impediments here. First, in this business of 
applied values , one appears to be considering three distinct factors: 
how much this other person needs (burden on the benefactor), how 
much good it would do this person if helped (benefit to the bene-
ficiary), and how dear this other person is to me (relationship of 
beneficiary to benefactor) . The interplay of all these factors would 
seem to promise a fair judgment. I must consider how much claim on 
my own life and resources is being made, how much proportionate 
gain this will bring my neighbor, and how dear to me my neighbor is 
or how beholden or bound to him or her I am. But when one cal-
culates the anticipated benefits to the other person by that person's 
anticipated social response, then the factor supposedly respecting my 
neighbor's welfare is turned around and becomes, in effect, an indi-
cator of how pleasant it is to have that person around. The benefits 
anticipated are measured, °not intrinsically with respect to him or her, 
but extrinsically with respect to myself and others who stand to gain 
from a grudging judgment. The calculation is no longer an interplay of 
interests ; it is put entirely at the pleasure of the one in power. The 
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neighbor and the neighbor's future are cast into dependence on how 
useful I reckon him to be .to the rest of us. So when H. Tristram Engel-
hardt, Jr. wants to relieve some infant of the "injury of continued 
existence" or SS Gruppenfuhrer Prof. Karl Brandt describes the elim-
ination of "useless eaters" and "undesirable individuals" as an "act of 
grace," I suspect that this is an injury I should pray for and a grace I 
should shun. This concern for "quality of life" is a self-concern bear-
ing the likeness of other-concern. 
The second ethical impediment is raised by the readiness to treat 
persons according as it would be valuable for them. I do not wish to 
question the way in which persons are evaluated. Quite clearly others 
are more or less valuable according as they become socially valuable, 
or as they realize their "relational potential." What I would dispute is 
that we have any ethical warrant to make this value the first basis for 
our treatment of others. 
Let me suggest another way of approach. Rather than designating 
all human life as valuable, I would propose that all human beings are 
not valuable. They are invaluable. Our fellow humans are not merely 
the most valuable things around; they are off the scale, truly incom-
mensurable, not even to be introduced into the rate of exchange 
whereby we convert the relative values of other things. A human being 
can be valued, as has been described. But a human being ought also, 
and more importantly and fundamentally, be reverenced. Possibly this 
would support the way some folks have of calling life sacred: not 
because of any necessary relationship to God, but because it seems an 
appropriate category in which to shelter those very precious beings of 
transcendent goodness . As -Simen- Peter- explaine-ct-1;o-Simon- Magtts; 
ther-e--afe-se ·me-t.R-iags-t-ee- valti-a-l71e-tO--hav.e a price. The governing 
insight in this assertion that human persons are beyond value -legit-
imate without recourse to religious premises - is that mankind is 
obliged, if they are to live and grow in spirit, to deal with others not 
simply according to what good it may produce, what use it serves, 
what response it subsidizes. 
Corrupted Morally, Destroyed Spiritually 
We are corrupted morally and destroyed spiritually if we treat 
others only as they are valuable. We have of course only limited goods 
and service to dispose of, and fellow humans whose needs and claims 
far exceed our wherewithal. In matching our resources to their needs 
we are presented with a most rudimentary moral option: whether to 
exert ourselves to meet those endless neighbor-needs, or whether to 
adjudicate those needs and claims to serve our pleasure by calculating 
their social benefit potential. There is obviously no congruence or 
conformity between the invaluable persons we confront and the value-
benefits we might afford them. But there is a telltale and deep-cleft 
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difference whether they are the measure of our lives or we the 
measure of theirs. 
This is not, as I say, a religious position, though it might be. The 
injunction that mankind is to be provided for, from each according to 
means and to each according to need (an injunction more gracious 
than all this calculation of values), may be ascribed either to first 
century Jerusalem Christians or 19th century Russian-German 
atheists. Both were of the mind that it is not enough to run a cost-
benefit analysis on one's neighbor (though that is exactly what most 
Communist powers and some Christian institutions are now doing). In 
any case, what I know of Christian faith reinforces the conviction that 
no follower of Jesus, holding in his or her hand the powers of life and 
death over those less advantaged, should begin to wield such powers 
by asking how much social yield there will be from any given material 
investment. We owe things of value to persons beyond value. Indeed, 
we live by a belief that it is the least able, the least forthcoming who 
have strongest claim on our lives and substance. 
One is often reminded that, whatever our disposition to treat our 
fellows as invaluable, there are still certain situations in which it is 
both allowable and dutiful to appraise others in a strictly utilitarian 
way. Triage is the typical situation put forward. At a field hospital in a 
combat zone, battle will produce casualties that swamp the capacity 
of the hospital. It becomes an inexorable fact that some must be saved 
and some left to die. A triage officer stands at the entry, sorting 
casualties so that the medical facility can accomplish the most prac-
tical good. One soldier disastrously wounded has to be set aside in 
favor of five others who, in the same amount of time, can have their 
lives saved. The battalion commander is sent in and the assistant cook 
held back. Officers have priority over enlisted men. Enemy wounded 
are given last place after one's own comrades whose survival will help 
the war effort. Faced with life-and-death needs and inadequate 
resources, the triage officer does his duty precisely by being ruthlessly 
utilitarian. The wounded are evacuated; they are treated in accord-
ance with their value to the group and to the struggle. People are sent 
for saving treatment or are left to die on grounds of the payoff a given 
amount of care will produce. 
About triage as a paradigm of ethical choice I would make several 
observations . First, even when it seems quite justified, it has a way of 
consuming a person. For a doctor, the fibers of whose self are braided 
into lifelines of generous concern, it snarls the soul, not simply to lose 
a patient to death, but to mark him or her for death. It may require 
uncommonly high and durable virtue to perform this task without 
making a vice out of necessity. To illustrate: during the Holocaust, 
certain Jewish community leaders, after agonizing at the Nazi order, 
consented to select numbers of their own communities to be sent to 
their destruction, in the hope that some others - the right others-
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might be spared. One such Alteste, leader of the ghetto in Lodz, 
Poland, explained: "Now, when we are deporting 10,000 people from 
the ghetto, I cannot pass over this tragic subject in silence. Unfor-
tunately, in this respect, I received a ruthless order, an order which I 
had to carry out in order to prevent its being carried out by others. 
Within the framework of my possibilities . .. I have tried to mitigate 
the severity of the decree. I have settled the matter so that I assigned 
for deportation that portion which was for the ghetto a suppurating 
abscess. So the list included the ousted operators of the underground, 
scum, and all sorts of persons harmful to the ghetto." 4 Another in 
Upper Silesia argued that the Jews should accept from the Gestapo the 
onus of selecting the contingents for extermination, so as to preserve 
for the community its most helpful elements. First to go, on his lists, 
were informers, thieves, and "undesirables"; next went the insane, the 
sick, and the defective children. 5 The victims had , by acquiescing in 
the work, somehow been contaminated by the minds of the oppressors. 
Even when necessity seems to call for it, can a person long deal with 
his or her neighbors in this way, calculating their "worth to society," 
their relational potential, without soon acquiring the perverse habit of 
mind which one wants to resist but perhaps cannot? 
Triage Easily Invoked 
Another thing about triage: it is so easily invoked. A few years back 
one had to decide which patients could have use of the few kidney 
dialysis machines and which could not. There was much evaluating 
then. And there could be little argument, and little misgiving, for there 
simply were no more machines to be had. But in a world where 
medical resources are never likely to satisfy medical needs, is not every 
day one of triage? Are not all medical practitioners who administer 
life and death likely to calculate the relative value of their patients? 
And will this reckoning not be heavily influenced by what this treat-
ment, what this survival would mean to them, the medics? It goes far 
beyond m~dicine. Johnson reminds us of "the competition for scarce 
monetary and manpower resources in society," and Garret Hardin is 
arguing from that that the United States had better leave the poorer 
nations to starve if it wants to preserve the good life . 
A recent newspaper canvass of citizen comment on the "boat 
people" from Southeast Asia who were frantically seeking asylum 
elicited a wave of hostile statements from Americans who insisted that 
our country could not harbor endless waves of feckless refugees. 
Knowing the devastation the United States has visited upon the home-
lands of these people, and that their predecessors have been some of 
America's most industrious and self-reliant immigrants, and that our 
country enjoys such relative abundance among the nations of the 
earth, what is one to think of these claims that a welcome for these 
refugees would be wasted? Why is it that the powerful and affluent 
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and engorged of this world are always the most aware that there is not 
enough to go around and that there are so many people who will make 
poor use of what is given them? 
And as for the necessity that imposes triage on us: granted the 
battle, it may be justified to pick some wounded to die because they 
are less worthwhile. But why grant the battle in the first place? 
Granted the inadequacy of medical care in poor communities, some 
people must be left to ail and to die who might otherwise be saved. 
But why grant the inadequacy? So often we consent to participate in 
what we lament as "tragic" decisions that cost other people their lives 
or well-being without challenging the social injustice that has imposed 
the tragedy. One is reminded of a proposal submitted to Adolf Eich-
mann: "There is an imminent danger that not all the Jews can be 
supplied with food in the coming winter. We must seriously consider if 
it would not be more humane to finish off the Jews, insofar as they 
are not fit for labor mobilization, with some quick-acting means. In 
any case this would be more agreeable than to let them die of 
hunger." 6 There is no triage when the same people who offer humane 
death are the ones who cause the imminent danger. And so it often is. 
There is, behind this application of value-theory, the possibility of 
great mischief (though I see Johnson and McCormick as willing parties 
to none of it). This can be seen perhaps by considering the canon 
drawn up at the conference at the University of California, San Fran-
cisco: "Life-preserving intervention should be understood as doing 
harm to an infant who cannot survive infancy .... " Compare this to 
the medical experience in Holland during the Second World War. 
"When Seiss-Inquart, Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands 
Territories, wanted to draw the Dutch physicians into the orbit of the 
activities of the German medical profession, he did not tell them 'You 
must send your chronic patients to the death factories' or 'You must 
give lethal injections at Government request in your offices,' but he 
couched his order in most careful and superficially acceptable terms. 
One of the paragraphs in the order of the Reich Commissar of the 
Netherlands Territories concerning the Netherlands doctors of 19 
December 1941 reads as follows: 'It is the duty of the doctor, through 
advice and effort, conscientiously and to his best ability, to assist as 
helper the person entrusted to his care in the maintenance, improve-
ment and re-establishment of his vitality, physical efficiency and 
health. The accomplishment of this duty is a public task.' The physi-
cians of Holland rejected this order unanimously because they saw 
what it actually meant - namely, the concentration of their efforts on 
mere rehabilitation of the sick for useful labor, and abolition of med-
ical secrecy. Although on the surface the new order appeared not too 
grossly unacceptable, the Dutch physicians decided that it is the first, 
although slight, step away from principle that is the most important 
one. The Dutch physicians declared that they would not obey this 
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order. When Seiss-Inquart threatened them with revocation of their 
licenses, they returned their licenses, removed their shingles and, while 
seeing their own patients secretly, no longer wrote death or birth 
certificates. Seiss-Inquart retraced his steps and tried to cajole them -
still to no effect. Then he arrested 100 Dutch physicians and sent 
them to concentration camps. The medical profession remained 
adamant and quietly took care of their widows and orphans, but 
would not give in. Thus it came about that not a single euthanasia or 
non-therapeutic sterilization was recommended or participated in by 
any Dutch physician." 7 
Truly human, relational potential was the guiding star over San 
Francisco. In Holland they seem to have held - with costly stubborn-
ness - that as doctors they would often have to tend patients who 
could never be cured. They knew their job was not to produce a 
healthy, working population, nor to eliminate the stunted; it was their 
profession to heal whom they could, alleviate the affliction of those 
they could not, and stand by all whom they served. They would have 
agreed with Johnson that death is not the ultimate enemy (though 
perhaps abandonment is). Their dedication, though, would be not to 
human life, as Johnson would say, but to human beings whose lives we 
heal if we can, but still serve if we cannot. 
Does it follow that all defective infants must, because reverenced as 
our invaluable human comrades, be given every available medical treat-
ment, no matter what the cost? I am not arguing that this must 
necessarily follow. What I am asking is that the issue be remanded 
for further and different consideration. One would require that when 
parents, physicians and statesmen look into a crib to ask themselves 
whether it be right to let death claim a blighted child, they not con-
sider what measure of potential the infant has to become truly human. 
For their purposes, that stunted, afflicted fellow human of theirs is 
already as invaluably valuable as he or she ever will or would be, and is 
far more dependent on them than are most children for the protection 
of its person and its life. 
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